David Einhorn on Pireus Bank: now I know what He thinks

I am grateful to reader IAthinker who commented on my recent Pireus bank post providing a link to David Einhorn’s presentation he gave at the recent Robin Hood conference, an annual gathering of Hedge Fund managers. At the conference, Einhorn reiterated his bullish stance on Pireus and Alpha bank, two of the biggest banks in Greece. As regular readers know, I have always wanted to understand Einhorn’s (Seth Klarman and John Paulson are long this stock too) thesis and I read the presentation with great interest.

As most presentations or writings by Einhorn they are fun to read, full of interesting charts and thoughts. He starts with the bullish case (40 slides) for Sun Edison (SUNE) – a solar company he thinks undervalued. The next 40 slides are reserved for the Greek recovery and said bank investments. He finishes by noting that France is in a mess and its bonds overvalued.

To sum it up: the solar case sounds interesting and I agree 100% with him on France. I disagree, however, with his bullish view on Pireus bank. In the following analysis I will present my view on the main bullish points made by Einhorn. Since this is a lengthy post, I have decided to divide it up: The first post analyses his macroeconomic arguments, whereas in the second post I proceed to the microeconomic, i.e. bank specific aspects of the case. For that reason I will not follow the order of the arguments in the presentation, so do not be confused.

Point Nr. 1: Improved Competitiveness of the Greek Economy

At the beginning, David Einhorn points out how the hard reform measures the Greek government has undertaken, such as slashing the minimum wage and reducing pensions, have increased competitiveness and improved business climate, a fact which has been duly mentioned in the World Bank’s  recent “Doing Business Report” (via. Klaus Kastner’s blog). According to the World Bank, Greece has improved its ranking by 40 notches since the beginning of the crisis, albeit it still ranks at the bottom among EU countries.

Einhorn underlines his argument by pointing at charts such as this one:

EinhornandImprovingData

Now, if you ask me, the chart still shows a contraction in the actual figures with unemployment (a lagging indicator!) merely levelling off, not improving! All the positive figures are merely forecasts. And we all know that most government/IMF forecasts are – better: have to be – skewed to the positive for political reasons (politicians want to have an excuse not to undertake reforms) – in agreement with their Keynesian in-house advisors who do not want to shatter “confidence”. This, and the fact that currently all major European economies are slashing their growth forecasts, makes me somewhat sceptical.

Listen, I generally agree that the Greek government has undertaken steps in the right direction. After all, they faced what awaits all socialists at the end of the road: the end of other people’s money. This is why I have been long two Greek stocks (OPAP and Mettka) for the better part of the past two years. Under normal circumstances it might be straightforward to conclude that a more competitive economy means great prospects for the banking sector and there is the notion on Wall Street that you best “play” the economy by investing in banks. However: whoever came up with that idea (a long time ago, as it is old) did not face the current debt problem that still plagues Greek economy, as I will discuss next.

Point Nr. 2: Greece is better than France (Debt problem solved?)

Einhorn seems to think that Greece’s high debt load (public debt @ 175% of GDP) is not an issue as it is owed to supranational (ECB; IMF, Euro zone countries) at below market rates and with long tenors. He then pulls out this chart that shows Greece’s interest rate burden steadily declining and compares this to the French figure. No doubt: it suggests substantial impressive improvements ahead.

GreeceInterestPaymentas%ofGDP

Now, the question before us: how can Greece reduce its interest burden by almost 50% without repaying anything  – it still has a budget deficit, remember – and absent any new debt restructuring?

How, David?

I got so intrigued by this chart that I even decided to look up the autumn budget forecast of the European Commission. On page 174 of the report you have the budgeted interest expenses for all Euro zone economies. I have reproduced the relevant section (Table 37) below:

EUComissionBudgetAutumn2014

And there you have it: the European Commission forecasts Greece’s interest expenditure to come in at 4.3% for 2014 and at 4.2% in 2015 – twice the figure in the presentation. I repeat: this makes intuitive sense, since absent another debt write-off there is no way Greece can reduce its debt burden by the amount indicated by Einhorn. In other words: ALL the beneficial effects of the restructurings are already in the figures – sorry, it doesn’t get better than that!

Note that Greece (together with Italy and Portugal) has still the highest public debt burden of the Euro zone, despite the default and despite the generous terms on its debt.

Note also that Einhorn got the French figure (2.3%) right – chapeau 🙂

What do we make of that?

I do not hope/assume Einhorn deliberately wanted to convey a wrong picture. It is more likely that one of his many analysts made a mistake. Nevertheless, he should have noticed that this doesn’t add-up. Worse, the mistake is not merely academic, but has real implications for Einhorn’s investment thesis as it means that the Greek sovereign still has a massive debt problem, something which has to be addressed when talking about bank investments. Unfortunately, it is something he doesn’t mention further in his presentation.

So let me drop a few words on Greek sovereign risk, then.

Obviously, the high debt load indicates a high probability of another default. Although the debt is mostly owed to foreign non-private entities, this is not necessarily an advantage. With whom do you think you can restructure your debt quicker and in a more meaningful way: with private investors, or with the EU Commission/ECB/IMF? Clear answer, if you ask me. Apart from that, there are still the constant negative repercussions of a debt overhang: political tensions and public unrest are a constant danger, higher risk perception negatively affecting bank funding and margins another and, whereas Greek households might not own much Greek sovereign debt, Greek banks surely still have high direct sovereign exposures. But more on that in the next post…

Point Nr. 3: Oligopolistic banking markets are highly profitable

After numerous restructurings and mergers during the crisis, four banks have come to dominate the Greek banking market with a combined market share (assets and deposits) of 93% among themselves. The graph compares banking sector concentrations in various countries to average ROEs implying high future profitability for Greek banks.

EinhornProfitabilityOligopolistic

Now, on the surface, it is hard to argue with this thesis. Players in oligopolistic markets should earn a higher return due to limited competition. The problem at hand: what defines an oligopolistic market?

Mainstream economic theory grades markets according to the number of players operating in it: the more players, the higher the competition.

This is (mainstream) theory. What about real life?

In real life it is difficult to count the “true” number of players. You could have a lot of players in one sector, some of which occupy a niche in that market allowing them to still earn high ROEs. Alternatively, you could have only one or two players but competitive prices and average profitability. How? Well, they might be so-called “Contestable Markets” where the threat of another player entering the market keeps prices down. Airline routes are a classic example for the latter.

According to the Austrian School, a competitive market CANNOT be meaningfully defined by the number of buyers/sellers, as the classic perfect competition model suggests. What MATTERS instead is whether there is free entry/exit into a particular market. As value investors only know too well: without barriers to entry a business is poised to earn mediocre returns, no matter how many players…

How does the Greek banking market score on that goal?

As in any other country, you need a licence to open a bank in Greece suggesting the existence of a moat. On the other hand, Greece is in the EU and one of the pillars of the EU treaties is the free movement of capital. If Greek banks earn high ROEs, this can and will attract other European banks to open a subsidiary in Athens and start earning high fees themselves. It is even conceivable that foreign banks enjoy a funding advantage, due to a better reputation, as is the case for Austrian banks in some CEE countries. This isn’t going to happen in the near future, but it doesn’t look like a sustainable “moat” to me.

Wait, but what about the banks in other countries such as Belgium, Sweden and UK? Don’t they earn high ROEs?

Unfortunately David Einhorn doesn’t provide details of how he computed the average ROEs, a crucial information – especially for bank financials.

First: did he use last year figures or cyclically adjusted ones? Credit risk is a heavily left skewed distribution which means that one or a few particular observation don’t tell you much. Since bank management has more discretion about managing the numbers than in most other industries a particular annual figure is even more meaningless.

Second, if he uses some kind of historic average (better), he faces two major obstacles:

  1. How to treat defaulted banks in the sample
  2. How to deal with the fact that most of the countries mentioned have experienced tremendous increases in debt over the past 20 years

Ad. 1.)

Two of the countries (UK, Belgium) on the slide saw large-scale bank defaults during the last crisis. Dexia and Royal Bank of Scotland RBS come to mind. In both cases equity investors got wiped out. Others (like Barclays for e.g.) got bailed out, i.e. equity investors were spared,  something which I think will not be politically feasible next time. This makes historic data somewhat unreliable even if cyclically adjusted correctly.

Ad. 2.)

Sweden and Australia had no major bank defaults during the last crisis (Australia didn’t even have a crisis as it profited from China’s mad construction spending binge). Fine! But there is another thing they have in common: their private debt levels (not government debt) have soared over the past two decades. According to the Geneva Report on the World economy, the private debt levels for the Swedish and Australian Economy stand at 252% and 180% of GDP, respectively. Compared to these figures, the famously levered US private sector looks thrifty in comparison (@160%). In other words: a debt crisis and mean reversion of those high ROEs are likely to happen sooner or later. Interestingly enough, in Spain, a country which also had a much-touted low public debt load before the banking crisis hit, private debt stands at 209% of GDP – right between Australia and Sweden.

Calculating bank profitability can be tricky as I have outlined above. Almost all of Einhorn’s oligopolistic markets have experienced an Alice-in-Wonderland environment over the past two decades: high debt growth and government subsidies that have skewed historic figures. It is difficult to see how this favourable scenario will repeat for the Greek banking system (and for all others) in the future. Therefore, I feel that the substantially lower ROE (14%) of the Czech banking system is probably closer to the truth – and even that strikes me as optimistic.

In the next post, I am going to discuss bank specific statements made by Einhorn…

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9 comments

  1. Hi There,

    I think that this is a thoughtful discussion of my Greek bank idea. Overall, I appreciate the discussion and hope that you find this post to be helpful. It is also much lengthier than the space I had for my presentation. That said, there are a number of things I would like to comment on (in choronolical order). This post is in response to Part I.

    1. Greek Employment is improving. It was 28% in Sept 2013 and been flat or better every month since and is now below 26%

    2. Greek GDP just did turn positive in Q3 (+1.7%). The 6 year recession appears to be over. While growth forecasts across Europe have disappointed, Greece has had a series of beats. Coming off such a depressed level, it is quite possible that there will be more beats in the future. But, like any forecast, time will tell.

    3. I never said that Greece’s high debt load is “not an issue”.

    I would argue that it is much easier to have all your debt basically with a single entity. Particularly when you owe that entity so much that there is little to nothing that they can do but make it easier for you over time – or of course risk that you suddenly default on all of it and leave a giant black hole in the EFSF. You can see how this has already played out with the bailout loans already having reduced rates of interest and longer maturities applied. Plus in any event of default on public debt the ECB will obviously be involved, as like last time, as they own it too.

    4. Greece does not have a material budget deficit.

    5. You ask how the debt services is so low absent a restructing. Here’s how:

    Debt service is obviously a reflection of interest payments paid on the debt and he doesn’t seem to have thought about that – I never suggested the total debt amount was decreasing as it is not. Greek debt used to primarily GGB’s paying a market rate of interest back in a time where interest rates were not zero. Now the vast amount of the debt is borrowings owed to the EU and the IMF. Total debt is €320bn. Of that, €154bn is owed to the EFSF and the IMF as part of the second bailout. This carries no cash interest payments at all until the decade long grace period is over in 2022. The €53bn EU loan related to the first bailout pays interest at Euribor + 150bps, down from the original loan fee of Euribor + 400bps. In total Greece owes €245bn to the EU, ECB and IMF and pays cash interest on this of just over €2.5bn. They also pay zero interest on their €15bn of GTB’s (covered by ECB guarantee). The €30bn of restructured GGB’s pay 2% interest. All of this data is readily checkable on Bloomberg and the internet

    You suggest 4.3% of GDP interest expenditure, which implies 8 billion of payments on 320 billion of debt, or 2.5%, yet we can see above that only a small portion of the debt carrries and interest cost above that rate. I suspect the EU forecast may include accrued interest on the 154 billion bailout loans that are adding up during the grace period. Even this is questionable as the EFSF loan does not have a fixed rate of interest chargable as far as I can see. In any case, I was referring to cash debt service costs, and I stand by my presentation.

    6. We do not believe that the Greek banks we own have high direct sovereign exposures.

    7. Regarding the issue of “moat”: I presented a thesis for 2017. I think it is extremely easy to suggest that there will not be any foreign banks in Greece again by then. And presumably if there are overseas banks that enter Greece, it is because the thesis has already worked very well. It’s hard to see why they would decide to allocate capital to Greece again unless the incumbents were earning outsized returns and they thought there was the opportunity to do the same.

    8. Neither Dexia nor RBS were bailed out due to failures of their local banking franchises.

    Dexia was a liquidity problem, where it lost wholesale financing and included massive Sovereign bond exposure to peripheral Europe into the peak of the crisis. It’s core Belgian operations have earned excess returns throughout.

    RBS had its own problems (ABN deal, US real estate, over stretched balance sheet). It’s core UK business earned an ROE between 16-18% from 2004-2007 followed by 11% in 2008, and 3% in 2009, before returning to the teens in 2010. By 2012, with less competition, it hit 24% and was 30% in H1 2014.

    We aren’t expecting anything that great in Greece, but it is illustrative of concentrated banking markets can yield excess returns, especially in a post-crisis recovery.

    9. We used 15% ROE in our estimates for a recovery. Other markets have done better. But, I won’t quibble over 14%. Should that be achieved, I don’t believe the Greek banks will trade anywhere near the current discounts to book value. for example, Komercni, the listed Czech bank, trades at 2x TBV for its 14% ROE.

    I will post comments on Part II shortly.

    Best,
    de

    1. Hi There,

      Here are my thoughts regarding Part II

      1. Relating ot the fall in funding costs:

      The 2.04% is the cost of new time deposits in August 2014. This is not the average cost of deposits in the Q2 2014 financial reports, which was 2.62% according to the same presentation (and 2.71% in Greece time deposits). This cost will reduce down to the new cost of deposits over the 1-2 quarter duration of the time deposits. So even without any additional lowering of deposit pricing you would still expect to see a near 60bps improvement. This is obviously very material given there are €29.6bn of time deposits (the rates are also coming down on savings and sight deposits but this is much less relevant). The 60bps is worth close to €200m of additional annualised PPI, compared with the €1.2bn annualised reported PPI in Q2 2014.
      How low can deposit rates go? Time will tell of course but rates in the other periphery are around 1% and the management teams of the Greek banks are clearly trying to reduce them towards this level. I would suspect another 50bps.

      2. Relating to the rising cost of long-term Greek Government debt

      This is a classic confusion between correlation and causality. Both deposit rates and GGB yields were falling up until recently. Since then there has been a sudden rise in GGB yields. Why? I believe the primary reason is that markets have started to discount political risk in Greece (this has also impacted equities as well, of course) ahead of a likely full election in 2015. These GGB’s total €30bn nominal in debt and have a market value of around €18bn. They are primarily held by hedge funds and other similar investors. There is no obvious reason why the trading of these investors in Greek Government debt should influence the behaviour of the average Greek depositor (particularly since depositors that left the Greek market to deposit elsewhere in Euroland have not returned to Greece). And so far this is what we have seen. Deposits increased at the banks in October and both banks recently confirmed to me that they saw no change in consumer behaviour (as of last week). Deposit rates in November are still going lower.

      3. Relating to lack of loan growth

      I do not rely on loan growth in my analysis, but on cost reductions and funding costs. However it is reasonable to suggest that GDP growth and loan growth do tend to correlate quite well and so it is quite possible that some loan growth might return to the market, as the economy recovers.

      4. Relating to Table 2.2 (Developed markets debt breakdown)

      This table seems to show something quite different to what you think. Whilst the 304% is correct the loan growth, or lack thereof, is likely to come most from the private sector (households and non-financial companies). Here Greece has debt to GDP of 129% (with the Government adding 175% to get to the 304%). This is actually the second lowest figure in the table, with only Italy lower at 125%. The US is higher at 160%. Leverage at non-financial companies is only lower in Germany and household leverage similar to most of the core European nations (France, Germany, Austria, Belgium). So, there is at least some room for private sector loan growth.

      5. Relating Piraeus’ topline growth potential:

      Your analysis also excludes the other major source of gains in PPI, which is cost reduction. They have €152m of additional synergies as part of their restructuring programme. This is to come primarily from branch closures and employee cost reductions through redundancies. Their medium term targets assume they will go further than this and I also think that plausible given how over branched Greece still is given the # of banks.

      6. We do not contend that the bankruptcy law change has anything to do with business foreclosures. Further, as we stated in the presentation, this will be a much bigger benefit for Alpha Bank than for Pireaus.

      7. Relating to collateral:

      Mortages are only a small part of Pireaus. The collateral is not PP&E. You ask a bunch of questions:

      “What type of do they count here? I hope it is not property, plant and equipment. How do they arrive at the figures? Transactions? Hardly possible in a depressionary environment. Estimated values (Appraisals)? If yes, how old are they? Are the values reported nominal values or haircut values? And how much is collateral worth in an environment where enforcement is legally difficult, anyway?

      Why don’t you try to answer them?

      Blackrock published a 173 page piece of research on all these issues (they also came up with stress test cumulative loss provisions that are very similar to those that the ECB stress test calculated) and it is available online. It describes answers to all of these questions.

      Let us take mortgages to start with. Piraeus, as per Blackrock in March 2014, had €17.3bn in mortgage loans. This represents 340k loans with an average balance of €51k, average coupon of 3.4%, average LTV of 71% and a weighted averaging seasoning term of 54 months (either since modification or since origination). 79% of these loans were current, 6% delinquent (90-359 days past due) and 15%. Values are updated on an annual basis through indexation to PropIndex. Blackrock then hired real estate agents to perform “drive-bys” to check to provide independent valuations. These valuations were 13-14% lower than on the books (this had strong correlation with loan size, and here Piraeus is lower than average so it’s possible that their adjustment factor might be lower). Let’s assume you haircut the collateral by 14%, then total mortgage coverage is 99% (cash and collateral). And this would be before ANY impacts from strategic defaulters or any recent modifications of loans ahead of the change in legislation.

      8. Then you ask “If collateral covers the net loans, why is the NPL ratio rising and standing at a record 38% of all loans, why are they not getting rid of these loans?”

      I think your question misses the point. Given that most potential purchasers of books of NPL’s do not possess servicing facilities in Greece, and that there was no law for reclaiming collateral in mortgages and an insufficient law for restructuring corporate loans, who would buy these loans and why would you want to sell them at the appropriate risk adjusted return these buyers would demand? In fact Piraeus has just got to setting up its restructuring division (2k employees were trained over the summer) and will take most of the next year from now to attempt to restructure its NPL’s. They can perhaps be criticised for taking too long to have got this far but then there has been bankruptcy, sovereign default, various cost restructuring plans, recapitalisation on the market, Blackrock I and II, the ECB AQR and stress test, running a business etc. Plus you are seeing a new law that will deal with corporate restructurings passing through Parliament now, which will enable rapid restructuring of Corporate NPL’s with agreement from 50% + 1 shares of the debt defaulted. Given that the banks will always hold this much they now have far more control over the process (this should reduce the process from 2 years to under 1 year).

      Further, the first signs even in consumer credit are positive. Piraeus offered restructuring to 20k customers who had defaulted and had been threatened with legal action. They offered forgiveness of between 30 and 50% of the loan if they repaid the rest. 10k started paying again. There is evidence everywhere of people who can pay, at least a bit, and are not.

      Also note that in areas where collateral is consistent with international peers some transactions have taken place, ie shipping, where Alpha have completed a few transactions in the space.

      9. Relating to your conclusion that NPLs from say 2010 have lost value:

      Most corporate customers are “cash and carry” businesses. So what happens when you get consumer spending growth and economic growth? Surely you get a much healthier corporate sector? As can clearly be seen from the Blackrock report companies fell in trouble due to large declines in EBITDA, in many cases leaving margins –ve or net debt to EBITDA of more than 8x. This is obviously why provision levels here are high at 67% in cash. But there could well be a significant change here if the cycle turns and growth returns.

      10. Relating to Figure 8. The AQR adjustment chart:

      Modifications were made to Piraeus totalling €2.2bn. This is a downwards adjustment in book value that they apply for the purposes of their analysis in the AQR and stress test. This analysis will not be reflected in the financial reports of the banks, and that probably gives a good sense of whether they are merely prudent or actively punitive (if they were prudent you would expect the banks to immediately adopt them). This largely relates to use of collateral vs cash in dealing with corporate exposures. In the event that a corporate is a “going concern” (defined as net debt to EBITDA of <6x) then only cash flows can be considered, and if the corporate is a “gone concern” then only collateral, with significant haircuts applied (mainly to real estate). This is a sensible measure to take for a stress test, but this is not the reality in which the banks are dealing with day to day in an attempt to get paid on their loans.

      11. Relating to Figure. EBA Stress test results.

      This is the Basel III fully loaded ratio under the adverse scenario in the ECB/EBA stress test. Obviously you would not want to own the Greek banks if you believed in the assumptions backing the adverse scenario, which include:

      A cumulative GDP decline of 2% from 2014 through 2016

      14% further price hits to real estate, and 38% to investment property

      17% more NPL’s (as a % of gross loans) from 2014 through 2016, versus 1.5% in H1 2014

      A decline in net interest income (driven by NPL’s and higher deposit costs) to 45% lower than the current run rate (which is more severe given that we have already earned higher rates in 9M 2014)

      I don't believe that any of these things are likely.

      But, there are also further problems in this analysis.

      The balance sheet date they have used for this is year end 2013, so of course this ratio does not include the capital that was raised in 2014, for a start

      Basel III in principle is a very good thing. The aim was to link capital ratios to capital that is actually loss absorbing and not just accounting book equity. So no more goodwill, or embedded value of life operations, or DTA’s etc etc. This has hit the Greeks, and other periphery banks, who amongst other things have lots of DTA’s as they have had lots of losses. So for Piraeus (and Alpha) the bank capital ratio in the chart above would NOT include the Greek Government Preference shares, nor any DTA’s, nor Pillar I bonds (subsequently sold) nor any capital raised

      The ECB has, apparently, informed the banks on how to restructure their DTA’s into DTC’s so they will be loss absorbing capital from a Basle III perspective. Reflect that, and the other changes I talked to, and the Basle III ratio will begin to be very similar to the CET1 ratio. This is still low – but then of course I do not expect the adverse scenario

      12. You write "Piraeus bankwill have to come up with substantial equity in the next five years – it will be a long time before Piraeus can grow its loan book substantially, let alone pay dividends even if profitable. "

      This is simply incorrect. That is not the ramification of the stress test.

      13. Relating to the margin of safety.

      I think you are conflating our guess of future value with margin of safety. Margin of safety has to do with downside protection from current levels. Today, Piraeus trades at at significant discount to book value, even with full AQR adjustment.

      As for the upside, you still assumes that PPI does not go higher than €1.2bn per annum, whereas there are obvious gains through operating expenses and deposit costs (already achieved at today’s market rates) that easily add over €0.35bn. This is with no recovery in volumes or other revenues or any further reduction in deposit costs (every 10bps is worth another €30m) or any more cost saves.

      Time will tell how much upside can be achieved. But, in our experience taking a static analysis of banking results at the end of a six year local depression is hardly reflective of what can happen in a recovery.

      Even using your view of the Czech as the proper comparison with a 14% ROE, the recovery value for Piraeus is far above current prices.

      Overall, I hope you don't mind my commenting. I enjoy a thoughtful response and a healthy debate.

      Time will tell who is right and we will all see how this plays out.

      Best
      de

  2. Very interesting debate.

    One thing that jumps out to me as a casual observer is the extremely high L/D ratio, which highlights a high level of liquidity/refinancing risk given the heavy reliance on wholesale funding. It appears in this case that assets are heavily financed by repo.

    I assume David’s assumption is that the ECB is prepared to backstop any liquidity shortfall in the repo market through their daily operations ?

    It is just interesting that this exact mis-match is what precipitated the banking crisis in 2008 when the European banks were faced with a frozen ST dollar funding market which began the deleveraging in earnest.

  3. Hi, I don’t understand this quote from your article,
    “According to the Austrian School, a competitive market CANNOT be meaningfully defined by the number of buyers/sellers, as the classic perfect competition model suggests. What MATTERS instead is whether there is free entry/exit into a particular market. As value investors only know too well: without barriers to entry a business is poised to earn mediocre returns, no matter how many players…”

    If there are no barriers to entry BUT also no competitors (or maybe just 2-3), how come returns are still mediocre? I have seen this strange case where a company or two are doing something nobody else does but that there is no reason they can’t (just maybe they don’t want to bother).

    Thanks.

    1. Hi Alex,
      “If there are no barriers to entry BUT also no competitors (or maybe just 2-3), how come returns are still mediocre?”

      Because you fear that once you raise your prices to improve returns, the number of competitors WILL increase (no barriers to entry) and you might end up even worse than before by, for example, losing significant market share.

  4. Hi there, I’ve just read the article on D.E. presentation. I think he may be not so proud now for his predictions-investments back then …. Personally, I feel a bit more optimistic for Greek banks now than ever before… but there are plenty of risks involved. Opap and Metka still two of the best choices around. I hope you will find time to post more regularly. Best regards, Dimitris

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